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Abstract 
 
This paper will outline the debate that has arisen in international law 
due to the requirement for an action to have been “committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a… group, as such” to be 
considered an act of genocide. It seeks to summarize and define the 
usage of ‘intent’ as it relates to the UN Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide and determine how international courts 
can adequately determine the intention of accused genocidaires. An 
examination of the two principal approaches to establishing intent, as 
required in the prosecution of these cases, will be conducted. The 
structure-based and knowledge-based approaches to understanding 
genocidal intent will be evaluated, with the preference given to the 
latter as it allows for an increased ability for courts to determine the 
culpability of the accused and a more effective prosecution of 
genocidaires. 
 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) sought to prevent a repetition of 
the atrocities which took place during World War II by defining and 
codifying and defining the crime of genocide in international law. 
From the early biblical era to modern-day Sudan, this heinous crime 
has plagued the world for centuries in almost every corner of the 
globe. After much debate and discourse, the then-newly formed 
institution of the United Nations agreed to a workable definition of 
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'genocide' and undertook “to prevent and to punish” further acts of 
this atrocious nature. The core of the resolution lay in Article II, 
which defined the crime itself. The resolution sates: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.1 
 
Though controversial, this definition continues to inform the legal 
framework behind genocide legislation. This paper will analyze the 
debate that has arisen in international law because of the requirement 
for an action to have been “committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a… group, as such” to be considered an act of 
genocide. This paper will begin by outlining and defining what the 
usage of ‘intent’ refers to within the Convention and how 
international courts can adequately determine the intention of 
accused genocidaires. Afterwards, an examination of the two 
principal approaches to establishing intent, as required in the 
prosecution of such cases, will be conducted. The first is the 
‘structure-based approach,’ which requires a conscious desire on the 
part of the accused to destroy the group in question. The second is 
the ‘knowledge-based approach,’ which instead qualifies intention as 
whether the individual knew, or ought to have known, that their 
actions would ultimately lead to the destruction of the group. 
Preference will be given to the latter approach, as it allows the courts 
to more easily determine the culpability and prosecution of 
genocidaires.   
Intent is a mental element of a crime that is exceptionally 
difficult to prove in law, particularly when it is analyzed within the 
context of an already complicated international-legal framework. 
Before addressing the debate surrounding the notion of intent, a 
proper understanding of the term must be established. The most 
common interpretation of the term, as determined by jurisprudence, 
                                                 
1 “Resolution 260 (1948) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide," U.N. General Assembly, accessed November 20, 2011, 
http://.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html. 
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is to consider intent in the context of genocide as a dolus specialis or 
special intent. The landmark case in which this term was first 
employed was in the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor of a 
town in Rwanda, who was charged with the crime of genocide by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the mid 1990s. 
The ICTR defined intent as “the specific intention, required as a 
constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the 
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged.”2 In other 
words, the specificity of the intention of the accused must be to 
"destroy, in whole or in part, a… group, as such" and not to kill in a 
seemingly random fashion.  
 The use of specific intent in law is not uncommon. As Otto 
Triffterer illustrates, in order for an offense to be unlawful, an action 
requires, in addition to an actus reus, the equivalent mens rea.3 However, 
in cases such as genocide, the crime is punishable only if the offender 
acts with an additional specific intent.4 This concept of specific intent is 
not exclusive to international law; it is commonly found in US law in 
addition to mens rea in cases of crimes that require more serious 
prosecution such as ‘assault with a weapon,’ and ‘assault with intent 
to rape.’ 
Proponents of this interpretation of intent argue that specific 
intent is necessary in distinguishing the crime of genocide from other 
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, confirming 
genocide as is considered to be the more serious of the two.5 
                                                 
2 Kai Ambos, "What does ‘intent to destroy’ in genocide mean?" International Review 
of the Red Cross 91 (2009): 836-7. 
3 Actus reus is defined as "the voluntary and wrongful act or omission that 
constitutes the physical components of a crime. Because a person cannot be 
punished for bad thoughts alone, there can be no criminal liability without actus 
reus." Webster's New World Law Dictionary, s.v. "Actus Reus." Mens rea is defined as 
"the defendant’s guilty state of mind, as an element in proving the crime with 
which he or she is charged." Webster's New World Law Dictionary, s.v. "Mens Rea." 
4 Otto Triffterer, "Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part 
the Group as Such," Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001): 403. 
5 Katherine Goldsmith, "The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and Its 
Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Toward a 
Knowledge-Based Approach," Genocide Studies and Prevention 5 (2010): 241. 
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However, as Katherine Goldsmith points out, this is conceptual 
separation and is not necessarily accurate. She argues that genocide is 
in itself a crime against humanity as evidenced in the Kayishema and 
Ruzindana Judgements of the ICTR. These judgments state that ‘‘the 
definition of the crime of genocide was based upon that of crimes 
against humanity,” 6 which the Rome statute defines as 
“acts…committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population.”7 Special intent, then, can still 
be used to distinguish between genocide and other charges, 
dependent upon the specific intent of the genocidaire. To illustrate, if an 
accused individual is shown to have killed, or intended to kill one 
thousand civilians selected at random, he could theoretically be 
charged with a crime against humanity. However, if it turns out that 
these thousand civilians were all members of a particular religious 
group, and the specific intent involving the destruction of a particular 
group can be determined, this can lead to a charge of genocide 
instead. Practically, this implies that the accused may (as is often the 
case) intend for more destruction than can be reasonably 
accomplished. A parallel drawn by professor Kai Ambos “would be a 
white racist who intends to destroy the group of black people in a 
large city but, acting alone, will only be able to kill a few members of 
this group.”8 At face value, the specific intent exists, and the racist’s 
actions effectively fit into the definition of genocide, despite the fact 
that he may have only been successful in killing one or two members 
of the racial group. But in reality, this example is not what most 
consider to be a crime of genocide and the racist would likely be 
charged with a lesser hate crime instead. Needless to say, the 
complexities of adequately defining the specific intent that is required 
for the charge of genocide have further complicated the prosecution 
of the crime.   
                                                 
6 Ibid., 250. 
7 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” U.N. General Assembly, 
accessed November 20, 2011, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a84.html. 
8 Ambos, 835. 
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One of the most problematic facets of including ‘intent’ in the 
definition of genocide is that in addition to defining intent, the courts 
need to further determine whether the actions of the accused fit into 
the convoluted description of the requirement. In most cases, 
governments, groups, and individuals accused of genocide are not 
explicit in their intentions. Without direct evidence, it is up to the 
courts to determine the intention of the accused. The Akayesu trial 
sought not only to define specific intent as it is required to fulfill the 
crime of genocide, but also to discover how we can determine the 
intent of the accused in cases where it may be difficult to do so. The 
trial chamber noted that intent is a mental factor that is hard to 
determine without a confession or other direct evidence. For this 
reason, the chamber ruled that courts could infer intention based on 
a number of presumptions of facts. They stated: 
…it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a 
particular act charged from the general context of the 
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed 
against that same group, whether these acts were committed by 
the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale 
of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a 
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and 
systematically targeting victims on account of their 
membership of a particular group, while excluding the 
members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the 
genocidal intent of a particular act.9 
 
Given this precedent, the prosecution in cases related to genocide is 
able to draw upon facts such as the use of derogatory language 
towards the targeted group, the extent of injuries and the weapons 
used in order to demonstrate the sufficient specific intent required.10  
Rather than providing a clear, legal precedent for prosecuting 
genocide, the Akayesu trial and its requirement of demonstrating 
                                                 
9 Cécile Aptel, "The Intent to Commit Genocide in the Case Law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda," Criminal Law Forum, 13 (2002): 287. 
10 Ibid., 288. 
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specific intent has undoubtedly led to further scholastic debate in 
terms of the many accompanying legal problems that needed to be 
addressed. It has been argued that the requirement of specific intent 
has allowed many genocidaires to escape conviction for the crime. 
Goldsmith cites the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) as an example in which the confusing definition of specific 
intent, as it applies to genocide, “has allowed people who have given 
direct orders to commit genocide, and keenly participated in the 
genocide of Bosnian Muslim men, such as [Radislav] Krstic…and 
most recently Drago Nikolic…to be convicted of the lesser offense 
of ‘aiding and abetting’ genocide.”11 To many, requiring specific 
intent seemed unsatisfactory when it came to adequately prosecuting 
the crime. In response, the scholastic community has focused their 
attention on two prominent approaches of addressing the legal issues 
surrounding intent in genocide: a ‘structure-based approach,’ which 
focuses on the intended purpose and desire of each individual as they 
contribute to the genocide, and a ‘knowledge-based approach’ which 
emphasizes an individual’s knowledge of the effects of his/her 
actions and how they affect the genocide as a whole. 
The structure-based approach towards prosecuting the crime 
of genocide (commonly referred to as the purpose-based approach) 
builds upon the requirement of special intent in determining the 
intention of the accused. Mathilde van Haren best defines the 
methodology in her report on the Darfur Commission, which took a 
structure-based approach to determining the specific intent of the 
accused genocidaires. She states, “The Commission seems to derive 
the requirement that the perpetrator must have consciously desired the 
destruction of a group from its assertion that the intent to destroy in 
whole or in part a protected group is an aggravated criminal intention 
or dolus specialis [emphasis added].”12 In other words, by taking a 
structure-based approach, the focus of determining the specific intent 
is on proving that the accused consciously desired the destruction of the 
                                                 
11 Goldsmith, 244. 
12 Mathilde K. van Haren, "The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darful and Genocidal Intent: A Critical Analysis," Netherlands International Law 
Review 53 (2006): 218. 
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group. This element of desire thereby allows for a workable 
definition of the specific intent that is required for a crime to be 
considered genocide. 
To illustrate, imagine two soldiers fighting for the same side in 
a civil war. Each soldier shoots exactly fifty men using the same gun, 
they are both faced with the same political turmoil, and each of them 
is following the same orders. The only difference between them is 
that one man is fighting out of choice and hatred of the other side, 
while the other man is fighting out of necessity, possibly because of 
forced conscription. Genocidal guilt would be determined based on 
the level of each man’s conscious desire to destroy the other group as 
a whole, meaning one would be guilty of genocide and the other 
would not. 
We see this application of the term ‘intent’ in past rulings on 
the understanding of Article II, most prominently in the 
interpretation of the United States’ Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. The Committee’s understanding states that “basic to any 
charge of genocide must be the intent to destroy an entire group 
because of the fact that it is a certain national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group, in such manner as to affect a substantial part of the 
group.”13 Rather than intending to destroy the group “in whole, or in 
part” as outlined in the UNCG, the committee has defined the dolus 
specialis as desiring and intending to destroy the entire group. Whether 
or not this is successful is a moot point as far as initial intention is 
concerned. 
This approach is perhaps the most literal interpretation of 
intent as it applies in Article II of the UNCG, given that it 
distinguishes genocide from other international crimes based on the 
perpetrator’s specific intent. However, the structure-based approach 
has certain fundamental flaws, the most prominent being that it gives 
low-level perpetrators an ‘easy out.’ By simply pleading ‘not guilty’ on 
account of following orders, culprits can often be acquitted of the 
                                                 
13 Lawrence J. LeBlanc, "The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide 
Convention: The Proposed US Understanding," The American Journal of International 
Law 78 (1984): 375. 
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charge of genocide based upon their individual lack of desire to 
destroy the group, rather than simply killing individuals who all 
coincidentally happen to be of the same ethnicity or hold the same 
religious views. That being said, when determining culpability for the 
crime of genocide, the international community is more often 
concerned with simply the top and mid-level perpetrators—the 
brains of the operation who hold the power to initiate genocide in 
the first place. They are, as Ambos puts it, “the ones who can and 
must act with the ulterior intent which is…characteristic of the crime 
of genocide and turns it into a goal-oriented crime.”14 For this reason, 
it can be argued that this approach is effective when it comes to 
charging the true genocidaires. By separating the low-level 
perpetrators from those considered to be mid or top-level, it allows 
those who truly made the important decisions to be the ones taking 
up the effort and cost of international tribunals.  
If we are to accept this methodology, however, it should be 
noted that, legally, this interpretation of the approach essentially 
violates the Genocide Convention in and of itself. As the UNCG 
states, “complicity in genocide [shall be punishable]…whether [the 
accused] are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals.”15 The initial drafters of the UNCG made it clear 
that private individuals who are complicit in genocide are just as 
guilty of the crime as those giving the initial orders. From a strictly 
legal standpoint then, we cannot exclude them from the crime simply 
because they did not have the same level of desire to destroy the group 
as others. This is one of the reasons why many scholars have turned 
to an alternative approach, one that focuses on the level of 
knowledge that an accused individual has regarding the effects of 
their actions.  
Most prominently proposed by Alexander Greenawalt, the 
‘knowledge-based approach’ towards establishing the intent of 
accused genocidaires proposes that “principal culpability should 
                                                 
14 Ambos, 849. 
15 “Resolution 260 (1948) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide." 
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extend to those who may lack a specific genocidal purpose, but who 
commit genocidal acts while understanding the destructive 
consequences of their actions.”16 Through this understanding, we can 
establish the intention of an accused genocidaire based on whether 
he/she knew, or ought to have known, that their actions would 
ultimately lead to the destruction, in whole or in part, of a group. 
This approach addresses the inherent problem of distinguishing 
between the desires of low, mid and top-level perpetrators that is 
faced by the structure-based approach and instead allows courts to 
prosecute any and all members of genocidal groups. Given that it is 
highly unlikely for an individual to destroy a group by himself, it is 
clear that generally there must be multiple parties involved if an act is 
to be considered genocide. Therefore, “it is enough evidence if the 
individual commits an act knowing that it would contribute to other 
acts being committed against a particular group, which when put 
together, would bring about the destruction of that group, in whole 
or in part.”17 By simply acting in accordance with the ultimate goal of 
genocide and with the knowledge that one’s acts, if continued, will 
lead to the ultimate destruction of a group, one can be found guilty 
of genocide regardless of the individual’s ultimate desire to destroy 
the group or not. 
By determining culpability through the use of the knowledge-
based approach, low-level perpetrators, who may not actually desire 
the destruction of the group but remain complicit in these actions, 
are just as guilty of the crime of genocide as those who premeditate 
their acts. Just as an individual may not have the desire to destroy a 
group, but still holds the knowledge of the consequences of his 
actions, so too does this approach address a similar, yet inversed 
problem that is faced by the structure-based approach. Given that the 
actions committed may lead to the destruction of a group, “the low-
level perpetrator can, by definition, have no knowledge thereof but 
may only wish or desire this result, since it is a future event.”18 A 
                                                 
16 Alexander Greenawalt, "Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a 
Knowledge-Based Interpretation," Columbia Law Review, 99 (1999): 2265. 
17 Goldsmith, 245. 
18 Ambos, 858. 
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member of the Nazi party for instance, who may hold the same 
ideological views as the leadership, may in fact have no knowledge of 
the effects of his actions if he is simply spending his days in an office 
building in Berlin as a cog within the immense bureaucracy that 
accompanied the Holocaust. Without the knowledge of the 
consequences of his actions, the Nazi bureaucrat, by the standards of 
the knowledge-based approach, would not be guilty of genocide. 
Acts of genocide are not acts that ordinarily occur by accident. 
They are, by nature, “conscious, intentional or volitional acts which 
an individual could not usually commit without knowing that certain 
consequences were likely to result.”19 The knowledge-based approach 
therefore offers a practical methodology in determining the intent of 
accused genocidaires, without discriminating based on level of 
involvement. That being said, courts are still given discretion when it 
comes to sentencing. Simply because two people are convicted of 
acts of genocide does not mean that they will receive the same 
punishment. It can be inferred that those who were more directly 
involved will receive harsher or longer punishments than those who 
are simply complying or following orders. However, just because one 
man is not doing the killing himself, it does not mean that he should 
not be held legally accountable for his actions. 
The knowledge-based approach gains further credibility in that 
it defines the mental element required for a crime to be considered 
genocide in a similar fashion to how it is defined in the Rome Statute. 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
states that a person shall be held criminally responsible for a crime 
when “a person has intent where…In relation to a consequence, that 
person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in 
the ordinary course of events [emphasis added].”20 ‘Knowledge,’ as it 
applies in the Rome Statute, is subsequently defined similarly to mean 
“awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in 
the ordinary course of events.”21 Needless to say, the ICC finds 
                                                 
19 Aptel, 276. 
20 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” 
21 Ibid.  
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knowledge of one’s consequences to be a critical aspect of the mens 
rea necessary to be culpable of genocide. Furthermore, the 
knowledge-based approach to understanding intent as it applies to 
the UNCG fits well within this legal framework, giving it credence in 
the eyes of the international legal community. Lastly, we can apply 
the knowledge-based approach to the Akayesu trial, which, despite 
the fact that its ruling mainly focused on determining how we can 
deduce special intent without direct evidence, stated, “The offender is 
culpable because he knew or should have known that the act 
committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group...”22 
It is clear that knowledge plays a large role in the international 
legal system when it comes to defining the act of genocide. What the 
knowledge-based approach accomplishes is that it ties together the 
‘intent’ requirement that is necessary for a crime to be considered 
genocide with the mens rea, or mental element, that is necessary when 
proving intent within this context. While the structure-based 
approach is derived predominantly from the notion of a necessary 
specific intent, it remains focused on the desires of the accused 
individuals. Regardless of whether it desires a specific end result, 
however, the knowledge-based approach holds individuals 
accountable for their actions which results in this undesired effect 
simply because the individual plays a role in the genocide itself. If the 
knowledge-based approach were to be taken as the methodology 
used by courts in determining the intention of those accused of 
genocide, we would likely see more convictions in cases of genocide 
and less acquittals based on the defense that genocidaires were simply 
‘following orders.’ 
If the international community is serious about undertaking the 
prevention and punishment of genocide, it must be able to 
adequately prosecute those who are committing the crime. 
Furthermore, in instances where it is necessary to prove a mental 
element such as intent, a legal framework from which we can derive 
the necessary information from must exist. What has already 
                                                 
22 John Quigly, The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis, (Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 113. 
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happened in the past cannot be changed, but through the use of legal 
precedents and by learning from the mistakes of history, the hope is 
that international courts will hold those who commit these heinous 
crimes accountable, and that genocidaires will be brought to justice. 
Only in this manner can the international justice system promote the 
United Nation's vision of universal human rights. 
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